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Abstract 
 
There have been almost 40 years after the restoration of democracy in Greece and a 
peculiar prosperity, which was consciously cultivated by the leaders of political and 
economic elites, was promoted before the onset of the financial crisis. However, from 
the beginning of the financial recession, the temporal illusions have been revealed and 
the need of a complete transformation of the financial policies has been expressed, 
while a significant transformation of the entire political culture has started. Parties 
such as SYRIZA, Independent Greeks(ANEL) and Golden Dawn took advantage of 
the growing social discontent by propagating their selves as exponents of ordinary 
people and of their concerns or their fears, as the expression of resistance against an 
avoidable sellout of public values. However, crisis has exposed a number of 
successive truths which were elaborately hiding in the underbelly of the detaining 
political and socioeconomic system. These truths were exteriorized once it became 
clear that the foundations on which the Greek society was based after the restoration 
of democracy, were weak and insufficient to guide the country’s way towards a 
modern future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1. The main achievement of the political change of 1974 
 
There is wide literature about the “political change” (µεταπολίτευση-metapolitefsi) in 
Greece after 1974 and the restoration of democracy, but a few are wondering about its 
main characteristics. Within a very condensed approach we try to define this political 
change as the transition from a long period of entrenched parliamentarism, which 
resulted in a brutal dictatorship, to a modern constitutional democracy. In other 
words, it is the obvious transition to the European system of guaranteed rights and 
freedoms and respectively of a structured charter of obligations. Actually, it is the 
transition from “Balkan provincialism”to a modern but limited Europeanization. In 
philosophical terms,it can be called as the transition from regime’s obscurantism, 
from arbitrary insolence of power and uncontrolled state authoritarianism,to a 
freeevolutionary period. 
 
Besides the political freedom and the introduction of the concepts of popular power 
and the welfare state in politics, this regime change was associated with the rapid 
expansion of social prosperity and unbridled consumerism. Relatively, Kondylis 
(2015) refers to the prevalence of a parasitic consumerism “indifferent to the long-
term national implications, especially with regard to the country’s independence 
andnational decision autonomy”. Kondylis uses the term “parasitic consumerism” to 
characterize the weakness of Greece “to produce everything that it consumeswithout 
having sufficient restraint - and dignity - so as not to consume more than can produce 
and in order to consume it parasitizes in two directions: internally, bymortgaging the 
future resources, turning them into current repayments, and externally, byborrowing 
large amounts of money not for future –fruitful- investments, but in order to pay these 
vast quantities of consumed products, which were mainly imported” (Kondylis, 
2015). This position,as reasonable as it may seem, it is actually simplistic as long as it 
ignores a whole range of material needs which had to be covered after the restoration 
of democracy. Among others, after the political change in Greece social inequality 
and poverty were drastically reduced as well as the total welfare of the society was 
significantly increased (Mitrakos&Tsakloglou, 2012, 33-35; 40-43; 55).This 
development was necessary not only as a way to establish decent living conditions for 
the population but also as part of the convergence procedure with the rest of the 
European Union. Significantly, despite the huge reduction of inequality and poverty 
that occurred after political change, Greece continues to encounter higher inequality 
and poverty levels and lower social justice levels than most of the European Union 
countries (Mitrakos&Tsakloglou, 2012: 56; Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2015). Moreover, 
the new regime marked rapid changes in the political field. In any case, the 
democratization of the country is related to the period of “change” from 19811 
onwards in the sense the “change” of the 1980s delivered a strong societal need: to 
overcome the hegemony which was established in the foundations of anti-communism 
domination. The negative effects of the “change” are well known; we tend to ignore 
though the consequences of a possible “non-Change” (Prevelakis, 2016). 
 
The fact is that the new regime as well as previous phases of Greek political history, 
integrated and generated varying structural “Greek pathologies” which derive their 
origin from the Turkish occupation. Despite this, however, the social, political and 
economic achievements of this period contributed to the adjustment of the country to 
modern international and European standards after a long phase of obscurantism and 
authoritarianism. Even if someone can criticize the new regime, no one should deny 
the positive aspects.Such positive aspects of the new regime with which the country 
should bereconnected,is the establishment of the National Health System, the 
introduction of labor and family law, the process of democratization of public 
institutions and of the army, the introduction of the transparent procedures for hiring 
in the public sector (ASEP) and of Citizens’ ServiceCentres(KEP), the establishment 
of welfare institutions, the creation of modern infrastructure but with disproportionate 
costs, the computerization of the public services, a fair redistribution of income and 
opportunities, regional convergence, decentralization and investment in education and 
innovation. Allthe abovementioned should not be underestimated. 
 
2. Some irrefutable truths  
 
The current economic crisis is frequentlylinked the period of thenew regimewith 
fiscal derailment and the creation of the sovereign debt problem. Specifically, the 
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“Change” was the main slogan of the social democratic party (PASOK) which won the 1981 elections 
and symbolized the national reconciliation and the reduction of socioeconomic inequalities.  
political and party system was totally eclipsed with the legitimate category that for a 
long period it has cultivated a cliental state with high corruption levels instead 
ofpreparing the countryfor theEuropeanisation process. Indeed, crisis has exposed a 
number of successive truths which were elaborately hiding in the underbelly of the 
detaining political and socioeconomic system (Mavrozacharakis, 2015). 
Thesethuthwere externalized once it became clear that the foundations of the new 
regime on which the Greek society was formed,were weak and not sufficient to guide 
the country’s process towards a modern future. 
 
The first obvious truth that is not assimilated by the existing political system is that an 
economy with weak productive base and hence with foreign trade deficit, produces 
continuous financial problems instead of producing sufficient job vacancies. The 
second truth is that the Greek political system is being reproduced for itself and not 
with the civil society. It is therefore a self-reporting system with embedded entropy 
mechanisms, i.e. self-destructive mechanisms.The third truth is that the state 
shouldnot become a key employer in the context of a capitalist economy, let alone if it 
is not supplied with the required performance conditions as well as egalitarianism and 
fairness. Ultimately,asLavdas (2013) aptly indicates,there is a fundamental deficit 
ofmodern Greek pragmatism,which actuallycomprise a significant obstacle to any 
rational attempt to recast the Greek state. 
 
3. The anti-political stateness 
 
The political forces, instead of trying to resolve the abovementioned urgent problems 
and peculiarities thatdeplore Greece, avoided to be placed in the axis of the real truths 
and remained exclusively locked to the dilemma “memorandum versus anti-
memorandum”. Unfortunately, the enlightened, progressive and democratic forces in 
Greece have failed to reunite the country with those productive aspects of the new 
regime which is stagnant,as a result of clientelism and fruitless “anti-
political”stateness. 
 
The anti-political stateness is interwoven with the specific character of the modern 
Greek state which does not manage to promote the collective interest, but enhances 
self-interest patrons, trade unions’ interests and cliental relations. The state in Greece 
after 1974 is used by multifaceted cartel parties, naturally as themain toolfor electoral 
victory. Even political parties such as PASOK, which in its origin had the 
characteristics of a mass party that according toAbedi (2004: 89-90) is distinguished 
by a broad and socially cohesive organized membership base, specific internal party 
processes and a statute authorities map, have totally been changed. Such parties 
hadthe character ofa movement with successful demands on social and political rights 
andfinally, were characterized by an intense process of transformation and alienation 
of their original character to take the form of an inclusive party and lately a cartel 
party. The inclusive party is now characterized by heterogeneity of its 
electoralbasewith electoral successbecoming its main objective. Unlike mass 
parties,which focus on a socially homogeneous audience, the inclusiveones appeal to 
a diverse electorate on the basis of modern communicative methods. Currently, the 
ideological differentiation passes into the background.Greek political parties formed 
patronage networks in the whole spectrum of society and did not function as 
intermediary civil society restraints but as mediatorsof specific interests and 
expectations of their clientele, transferring and representing segmented and specific 
requests within state. To the extent that vested political parties functioned more as 
state clientele representation, they gradually lost their organized basis and their 
number of active members has rapidly decreased. At the same time,parties’ 
subsistence costsincreased significantly as well as the communication cost with their 
electoral clientele. 
 
The abovementioned situation led these parties to a complete focus on the state as a 
supplier of the necessary resources. As Abediindicates (2004: 90), the need for 
resources and the deficit of large ideological and political conflicts turned the survival 
objective into the sole aim of incumbent parties. This common objective boosted the 
creation of a cartel which supplied its members with the necessary means for survival, 
while ensure that potential risks are limited. The invasion of incumbent parties in state 
power and the imposition of their survival over institutions’function,not only secured 
the necessary resources through, which vested parties perpetuated their survival, but 
also enhanced the ability of incumbent parties to resist facing challenges posed by 
emerging radical political formations of the left and the right of the political spectrum. 
Under these conditions, as stated by Katz and Mair (1992: 16), the statewas 
transformed into an institutionalized structure that only supports the“networked” and 
the“insiders” and excludes those who have not crept into the inner of such network 
(outsiders). In other words, these parties lost their mediatory function with civil 
society and were digested by the state. 
 
Especially in countries with great tradition in cliental distribution of privileges, such 
as Greece, cartel parties have found lucrative ground. Theonset of the economic crisis 
decreased significantly thepublic funds, which had catalytic role for the enhancement 
of the traditional cartel parties and consequently, their position in power was 
challenged by a new inclusivecoalition which was formed under the aegis of the left 
SYRIZA. 
 
Therefore, the total presence of political parties can be regarded as “anti-political” as 
long as there is aproblematic relationship with the collective well-being and the public 
interest. This means that the political parties in Greece did notservethe“common”, in 
the Aristotelian sense, namely the policy for the benefit of the society. At the center of 
party actions was the aim of the reproduction in power through the state rather than 
the public interest that determines the general concept of policy. For Aristotle, the 
coordinated society can be achieved through policy that promotes the common good. 
In this sense, the policy reduces individual harnesses and fragmented interests that 
endanger the social body and aims to maintain state normality and continuity 
(Brunkhorst, 1992). In modern societies the proper state is not possible to be 
established through a homogeneous community of virtue, as Aristotle introduced it, 
but through a community of law (rule of law) among unknown citizens. Political 
justice is achieved through the separation of those elements which are positive for 
everyone under eternal conditions and those that are positive for a specific group of 
people at a particular juncture. In other words, in modern democracies, justice and its 
promotion through respective institutions and relationships that are based on justice 
under conditions of autonomy of a conscious person, override the subjective and 
individualized parameters (Rawls, 1993). 
 
Regarding the subjective dimension in Greece, it turns out that the concept of rational 
citizen who promotes the cooperation with fellow citizens under commonly accepted 
conditions, has never been cultivated. According to Rawls, rational citizens are 
“willing to propose and abide by mutually agreed rules, provided that others will do 
the same; and will respect these rules even if this means that they have to sacrifice 
their personal interests. Rational citizens want to belong to a society where political 
power is legally used”(Wenar, 2010). However,in Greece the political system 
suppressed the real political, economic and financial imperatives, which, even in 
latent form,became an existential danger to the country. Generally, the state in Greece 
historically embodies only superficially the concept of financial rationality and 
balance of public expenditure and revenues, while rule parties represented with great 
zeal the essence of offering more benefits, in order to obtain citizens’trust. Therefore, 
citizens invested successively in benefits as an attempt to avoid unpleasant policy 
measures. 
 
In conclusion, these 40 years after the restoration of democracy in Greece, citizens 
lived in a sham prosperity founded on imaginary obsessions, consciously cultivated 
by the leaders of political and economic elite. However, since the beginning of the 
financial crisis, the temporal illusions and the need to change the whole political and 
economic system, became the main priorities which enabled enormous changes of the 
established political culture.In the beginning of the crisis the social democratic 
PASOK lifted the burden of fiscal adjustment. In 2010 PASOK took over the 
responsibility to implement austerity measuresthrough memorandums of 
understanding with the European Central Bank the European Commission and the 
International Monetary Fund, in order to avoid the bankruptcy of Greece. With the 
subsequent electoral collapse of PASOK, the right-wing New Democracy - along with 
PASOK - continued from 2012 the implementation of austerity measureswhich led to 
their electoral defeat in 2015. Parties such as SYRIZA, Independent Greeks (ANEL) 
and Golden Dawn took advantage of the growing social discontent propaganda to 
becomethe main exponents of ordinary people and of their concerns and fears, by 
expressing the resistance against avoidable oversell of popular values.  
 
4. The replacement of“anti-political” parties by an“anti-political” populism  
           
Especially, SYRIZA emerged to power through a combination of circumstances 
which abruptly and without intermediary interval adjustingperiod, entrapped Greece 
in a sovereign debt crisis. The origins of the crisis are in policies that previous 
governments implemented,which were arbitrarily addicted to irrational redistribution 
without the establishment a vigorous welfare state with efficient services and 
significant results in social inequality reduction throughthe promotion of social 
cohesion. Therefore, theeconomic crisis management, which is a tough and 
demanding task,changed the founding values of several political groups in Greece.
  
 
Definitively, the rise to power of SYRIZA overturned the conditions which were used 
in order to maintain the traditional bourgeois parties in power. From 2008 
onwards,the sudden elimination of those terms and conditions which reproduced the 
established cliental consent after the restoration of democracy in Greece, amid broad 
distribution of benefit and privileges, gradually led to a populist radicalization of the 
masses under the auspices of the left SYRIZA (Mavrozacharakis, 
Tzagkarakis,Kamekis, 2013). The main keynote address of SYRIZA, which was the 
world “hope”,can be characterized as“anti-political” in the sense that it was based on 
the versatility and on a high degree of ideological ambiguity. Therefore,there were no 
direct real class placements and external commitments. This fact is obviously contrary 
to the “left political verbosity” of SYRIZA which considers the “Greek people” as a 
single collective alliance against specific financial policies and international 
obligations of Greece. With anti-political way, namely by a methodology which is 
deeply contrary to the public good, SYRIZA cultivated to Greek peoplea deep feeling 
of antipathy towards political elites, the European Union, the German government and 
the employers in general.  
 
Specifically, in the midst of the economic crisis populism and its respective 
multipliers increaseddramatically. The pressure of unemployment, the new poverty, 
rage against politicians and the fear forsocial and economic collapse, offered more 
than ever, lucrative ground for a policy that worked with simplistic slogans fueling 
aggressive feelings, prejudices and resentments. However, over time, in the case of 
the SYRIZA, leftist self-determination was reversed into a peculiar mixture of “right, 
capitulated or even neoliberal left”, which reveals a huge gap between promises and 
implementation (Munchau, 2015; Kotroyannos, 2016).  
 
On the one hand, the rise of the left in power was a result of thestructural problems 
and economic weaknesses of the Greek state and the inability of the previous 
governments to promote the necessary reforms in order to establish a modern rule of 
law and an effective state with universal, efficient welfare state and fiscal tolerated 
social services. On the other hand, the imposed austerity programs from the European 
institutions and the International Monetary Fund (troika) are also responsibleas long 
as they did not let fiscal space for the promotion of social cohesion.The current 
contrast between financial authoritarianism and social achievements preservation 
comprises the continuation of a dangerous approach which considers the citizen 
mainly as a “customer”. Therefore,in this conflict there are neither visible boundaries 
nor clear dividing lines since the implemented austerity policies are defended both by 
right-wing and left/center-left-wing parties.  
 
SYRIZA, instead of analyzing the current situation with caution and realism, in order 
to propose long-term responses to the difficult circumstances, was either trapped in 
the search for ways ofthe new memorandum management or was assimilated by a 
fruitless intolerant logic. Apparently, this happened because the political tradition 
expressed by the new government of the left, comes equally from the past and does 
not represent anything really “new”. Therefore, thefirst dangerous and sensational 
alternative responses to the crisis, were followed by the usual manner of maintaining 
the power even by implementing anti-social and unrealistic measures, such as massive 
tax increases.  
 
5. Basic directions of a progressive response to the crisis 
 
It is clear that Greece needs a new productive system and in this context, a new 
political system, which produces goods and ideas that will be connected with a 
strategic framework,which increase employment. A meaningful progressive response 
to the crisis is not unilateral and obsessive, it should promote the necessary reforms 
but always maintain a certain level of social cohesion and not dissolve social cohesion 
to supposedly increasecompetitiveness. Germany can be areferring example, as long 
asit currently increases social spending and has introduced,under the pressure of the 
Social Democrats, the minimum wage of 8 euros per hour. A progressive response to 
the crisis should not hesitate but put the core European countries and particularly 
Germany, in front of their responsibilities.It should not be underestimated that 
Germany had offered to South European countries, for a specific time,extended loans 
and had promoted lending with attractive rates and favorable repayment terms. In fact, 
Germany has created inflation to other countries while it kept its own inflation in low 
levels through low wages. This fact, combined with the enormous public and private 
spending on innovation, was actually its competitive advantage. In that period in 
Greece the real challenge was the promotion of modernization and reforms. Twenty 
years later,the challenge has not even slightly changed and is high time to implement 
the necessary changes without neoliberal or leftist obsessions. 
 
If there is no real democratic and social shift in Greece, the group of voters who 
prefer electoral populism and especially the extreme right, will enormously increase. 
Moreover, these voters are at least“losers, unfinished consumers” (Bauman, 2010). 
This means that they do not prefer the abolition of the current society and the 
establishment of another but eventually claim to participate in it as full consumers, i.e. 
citizens of a capitalist consumerist society. 
 
Based on Bauman’s argument (2009), it turns out that people in post-modern 
societiesare only considered useful if they operate as integrated consumers. 
Consumption is actually the individual’s contribution to a market economy. An 
“unfinished consumer” has entrenched social status and is considered useless because 
his position is utterly hopeless. Modern societies reactcynically topoor people, who 
are unable to function as active consumers, converging in some way to a tendency for 
their disappearance from their apparent bourgeois façade. It is no coincidence that the 
poor are expelled from the west urban centers. This trend explains why the modern 
welfare state is unable to protect the unemployed and especially the long-term 
unemployed, considering that these people are no longer useful and only affect the 
taxpayers. The political consensus around the core features of the welfare state that 
takes care of the vulnerable and needy graduallybecomes finite. Only nostalgia 
remains alive. But nostalgia generates protest and centrifugal tendencies. 
 
The active solidaristproletariat has become a social layer of permanent precarity (the 
precariat), which supports dubious political directions (Standing, 2011). This shift is 
logically inevitable in the sense that the existing political forces that manage the 
power are possessed by the same fiscal obsession. According to Bauman (2009; 
2010), the reduction of social spending is an objective of both the right and the 
(center) left policy. Regardless of the party which is in power,the objective is the 
same just because they believe that according to the conventional economy they do 
not comprise financial advantages. In conjunction with the political behavior of 
impoverished social groups, populism is supported by relegation fears which occupy 
an increasing part of the middle socio-economic groups within the thorough process 
of modernization and globalization. A progressive reaction to these problems should 
consider all the abovementioned and implement a policy which will be concentrated 
both at financial normality and social cohesion promotion. 
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